The question of a nuclear-armed Iran is no longer hypothetical, we all know it. Recent escalations and illegal strikes have pushed Tehran further along the path of capability, if not overt weaponization. But for Pakistan, the prospect of a nuclear Iran carries complex and far-reaching implications, strategically, diplomatically, and regionally.
It is important to begin by recognizing a reality often overlooked in reactionary analysis that Iran’s threat perceptions are not imagined. For decades, Iran has faced an overtly hostile regional environment, surrounded by U.S. military bases, under constant threat from Israel, and deeply entangled in a web of regional rivalries. Its pursuit of a robust deterrent posture, while destabilizing, is not detached from this context. Moreover, under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran retains the right to peaceful nuclear energy, a right that has often been politicized, curtailed, or treated with suspicion. These contradictions cannot be ignored in any honest conversation.
Yet despite these layers of complexity, a nuclear-armed Iran is not in Pakistan’s strategic interest. And here’s why:
Destabilizing the Regional Deterrence Framework
Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine is anchored in credible minimum deterrence, refined through the framework of full spectrum deterrence, within a well-defined regional theatre which is South Asia. The introduction of a new nuclear actor to its west, outside of the India-Pakistan dyad, would disrupt the strategic balance Islamabad has carefully maintained for decades. A nuclear Iran could trigger a cascade of proliferation pressures in the Middle East, particularly from states like Saudi Arabia, further internationalizing nuclear risk in Pakistan’s extended neighborhood.
Erosion of the NPT Regime
While Pakistan is not a signatory to the NPT, it has long navigated its strategic identity with a view to responsible deterrence, including export controls, doctrinal transparency, and participation in global nonproliferation discourse. The collapse of the NPT’s credibility, if Iran were to weaponize, would lead others to follow - think KSA! This would expand the geography of nuclear risk in Pakistan’s immediate western periphery and inject volatility into a region where Pakistan has deep strategic, economic, and religious ties.
The concern is not about defending the NPT’s legal authority per se, but about preventing a wave of regional normalization of nuclear ambitions, which would undermine the exceptionalism Pakistan has carefully guarded in its own nuclear narrative.
Cross-Sectoral Fallout
A nuclear Iran would amplify tensions with Israel, intensify proxy conflicts, and likely provoke pre-emptive regional doctrines with spillover effects for Pakistan’s diplomatic space, particularly with Gulf partners. This would complicate Pakistan’s ability to maintain strategic balancing between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and could pull it into conflicts it has long sought to avoid.
Impact on U.S.-Pakistan Relations
Pakistan’s delicate re-engagement with the United States particularly post-May 2025, relies on strategic clarity and evidence of restraint. In a scenario where Iran moves closer to the nuclear threshold, Pakistan could come under renewed Western scrutiny by association, especially if narratives conflate proximity with complicity. The last thing Islamabad needs is to be dragged into the next front of proliferation anxiety.
Toward a Responsible Stance
It is possible and necessary to oppose a nuclear-armed Iran without demonizing Iranian security concerns. The challenge is not Iran’s demand for security, but the path it takes to secure it. The real risk is assuming that nuclear deterrence will bring enduring stability. South Asia has shown that while deterrence can prevent full-scale war, it also introduces new forms of instability, crisis cycles, arms racing, and misperception. Pakistan understands this tradeoff better than most that nuclear capability may offer existential security, but it also demands constant management, signaling, and restraint.
For Iran, crossing that threshold would not simply establish deterrence, it would lock the state into a protracted era of strategic tension, global scrutiny, and regional balancing that may ultimately undercut the very security it seeks.
The goal should not be to isolate Iran, but to engage it back into diplomacy that restores the balance between rights and responsibilities under the NPT. Pakistan has a role to play in this, not as a bystander, but as a regional actor with a deep stake in ensuring the Middle East does not enter a new nuclear age.
A nuclear Middle East needs to be seen in full context, not as a counterbalance but a risk multiplier. And for Pakistan, navigating uncertainty on one flank is difficult enough. We cannot afford a second.
Very well articulated.
But the recent crisis and military strikes by a defacto nuclear weapon state and an NPT nuclear weapon state have pushed Iran towards acquiring nuclear deterrent.
While the cost of acquiring it might be more, but seems like it has left with no choice but to acquire the weapon because diplomacy have failed, NPT guarantees have also failed. The division among P5 to react to this violation of NPT standards, IAEA stature and UN charter have further undermined the credibility of NPT.
However, Pakistan must play its role to pressurize P5 on legally binding Negative Security Assurances at CD plenary meetings taking place till september, the political diplomatic and military cost of attacking nuclear facilities must be debated at UN disarmament platforms.
The rationale for acquiring nuclear weapons have become far more logical now amidst the collapse of established nuclear non-proliferation treaty.
Generally speaking, Pakistan has a nuclear advantage in the region, especially among Muslim countries. However, lately, its nuclear deterrent alone has not been sufficient to circumvent skirmishes or threats with India, likely involving Israel.
US/Israel strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities, during ongoing diplomatic talks, despite Iran being a signatory of the NPT and IAEA conventions, have fully opened Pandora's box. I don't think there is any going back from here without assurances that are not based on mere words. And Pakistan is not in a position to give that assurance to Iran or to stymie the ambitions of the US or Israel in the region.
With Iran's ambiguous stance, even the axis of resistance, including China and Russia, is not clear on lending it overt support beyond what is minimally required. They, too, would not be keen on Iran obtaining nuclear capabilities before it adopts a clearer stance.
However, the key leading factor in this equation is Israel. Unless its nuclear capabilities are restrained, it will continue pressuring those in the region to develop some form of deterrence, even if nuclear. Pakistan can possibly play a role in uniting these powers under a single banner to provide an alternative form of deterrence, possibly even in the form of joint defense agreements, which should potentially delay nuclear ambitions in the region.